THE New Republic

1956 As Seen
By Fitzpatrick
And Herblock

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Fashions Among the Faculty

If You Teach, It's Smart To Be A Liberal

AN INDICTMENT BY MORTON CRONIN

WITH A REBUTTAL BY IRVING HOWE

Nine Lives for Labor . . . . . James T. Farrell

The Energies of Art . . . . . Christopher Sykes

A Reply to Some Critics . . Hans J. Morgenthau

A Poem by Robert Graves

THE SECOND-FATED

JANUARY 7, 1957 20c

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Washington Wire

The Wages of Sin

SOME people think the high moment in the American democracy comes when a President-elect and a defeated President ride up Pennsylvania Avenue together to the Inaugural, as Eisenhower and Truman did in 1953 and Hoover and Roosevelt in 1933. It means that politics cease at a point, but America goes on.

On November 7 at 1:25 a.m. Adlai Stevenson made his concession speech, one of the most eloquent of his life. "Tonight," he said, "we are not Republicans and Democrats, but Americans."

It would have been nice if the President had responded in kind. He didn't. He had waited to have the Stevenson speech over before making his own statement. The press quoted him as saying that he hadn't "listened to that fellow in the campaign and he wouldn't now." A noble moment whimpered out.

Harry Truman tells in Volume 2 ("Years of Trial and Hope") of his memoirs how coldly and suspiciously Eisenhower regarded him after the '52 election. Truman welcomed him, opened his files, brought Major Eisenhower quietly back from Korea for the Inaugural. But suspicion wasn't removed. The Righteous are not easily placated.

Now there is a new situation. Britain's Eden and France's Mollet have sinned. They must be punished. A Big Three meeting is almost essential to the safety of the democracies but that would mean accepting the sinners back. Nehru comes to the White House; Tito is invited—not Sir Anthony Eden. Most Americans think Eden made a blunder. Millions of Englishmen do, too. But he is still Prime Minister and when he is snubbed by Eisenhower, England is snubbed. What a little magnanimity could accomplish! But how convey that idea to pietistic people who know that their Motives are Pure?

McCarthy's Mark

SO FAR as is known every contempt case instituted by Joe McCarthy has failed; half a dozen so far. The latest is that of Harvey O'Connor, whose appeal against a McCarthy contempt citation is now unanimously upheld by an Appeals Court because the McCarthy questions put to him were "so imprecise and ambiguous." That was true too of the Leon Kamin and Corliss Lamont cases. So McCarthy stays in the Bethesda Naval Hospital as the courts pass their cold judgment. Joe never could bother with legal niceties.

A couple of million Americans probably still think McCarthy a martyr. But most former supporters have conveniently forgotten their erstwhile backing. We have a theory that McCarthy's most lasting harm was on young college people. Without knowing just why, a whole generation of American youth has been frightened. They don't join left-wing discussions or college liberal groups as their fathers did. It isn't done. The glory of youth is to experiment, to think, to rebel. Look at Poland and Hungary. Not American college youth today. McCarthyism taught its lesson—it is safer to conform. Watch your step. Don't be an egg-head.

We got that impression in the campaign. A nice undergraduate came up to our press group at an enthusiastic Nixon college rally in Kentucky (where they vote at 18). "Let's face it," he said smiling, "We're reactionaries!"

Then I think of the Young Gentlemen of Yale who almost blocked a Stevenson rally. They mobbed the hall. It took a courageous speech by Adlai to face them down. They did not seem to be Republicans particularly, they just held politics in contempt. In Hungary the revolution was led by youth. So in Poland. So it will be in Russia when The Day comes. We do not think the Young Gentlemen of Yale are quite that type. They wear proper clothes, join the right clubs and read *Time*. No rebels, they.

Nixon in '60?

AS FAR AS one can be certain of these things in politics we believe that Richard Nixon will be elected President in 1960. He will be supported, we believe, by an almost united Republican Party, and we expect the Democrats to be split down the middle and divided by then, perhaps into two parties. The big GOP Nixon build-up has started. Nixon was the voice of Eisenhower in his foreign policy speech before the Automobile Association in New York and he was the eyes and ears of Eisenhower on his Austrian trip, where he identified himself with the Hungarian refugees like a politician grabbing hold of Santa Claus. Knowland and Stassen may think they can stop Nixon; we don't.

But the big Nixon break comes from the Democrats. For the next four years, week in, week out, the Democratic Party is going to be associated with those Dixiecrats in Congress who fight integration, cloture and civil rights, support the natural gas grab and prefer—when you come right down to it—Nixon for President to a Northern Democratic liberal. They will run the committees while Democrats control Congress.

Other Democrats might save themselves if they faced the split squarely now and proceeded accordingly. We doubt that they will. One of the saddest things ahead, we fear, will be to see Northern Democrats knocked off in 1958 and 1960 because voters associated them with the Eastlands and Talmadges. It's uncomfortable to set these things down, but we might as well be realistic.

A "Grown-Up" Ike

THE Alsop brothers like Ike. He's a different, "grown-up" Ike today, they explained proudly in a happy column after the election (Nov. 11). More than that (Nov. 21) Ike "has now become his own Secretary of State . . . in day-to-day operating control of American diplomacy." But the Alsops love Britain and NATO, too. They deplored "American policy-makers" (Nov. 23) who allegedly created a Middle-East power vacuum. They blamed "official Washington" (Nov. 25) for building up Nasser (*not* Ike's "day-to-day" control). Increasingly disturbed, they explained (Dec. 19) "the truth is that this is now a physically tired Administration." They termed US defense policy (Dec. 21) one of "blood, sweat and dividends-as-usual." But never a word against Ike! For instance, denouncing the Nasser build-up again (Dec. 23) they said "we" did it—America, that is, you and me—not the man in "day-to-day operating control."

T.R.B.

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The New Republic

A JOURNAL OF OPINION

JANUARY 7, 1957

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Correspondence

► ***The Two-party System***

SIRS:

HELEN HILL MILLER'S analysis of the political situation in the South (*NR*, December 17) should cheer any believer in the two-party system. Moreover, I would go even farther than she does in anticipating that there may be a veritable revolution in the contests for Congressional and state legislative office in several Southern states in 1958 and 1960. In many state legislative districts in urban areas throughout the South, the Republican party is beginning to have a supply of attractive candidates for the first time in its entire history. If it organizes adequately at the precinct level, victories for many of these candidates might come with surprising ease.

Mrs. Miller's analysis of why the Northern and Western Democrats are pressing for action on matters of na-

(*Continued on page 23*)

A Reply to Bulganin

WHEN THE DRAFTERS of our Constitution gave the President the responsibility for conducting our foreign affairs, they provided no answer, nor could they, to the question: who shall act if the President is less enterprising than international circumstances require? Leadership in foreign policy has rarely come from Congress and when it has, it has rarely been of a constructive type. And yet from time to time Congressmen show they have something to offer. We cite as an example the New Year's Eve call for new US initiative in Central Europe, issued by a group of younger House Democrats.

The Congressmen suggest that Mr. Eisenhower answer Premier Bulganin's latest letter on disarmament by proposing a European security arrangement more equitable to both sides than the one offered by the Russians. They recommend demilitarizing Central Europe "for 1000 miles from the Rhine to Russia's historic boundaries" and a joint US-USSR security guarantee for that area. They also suggest (somewhat less realistically) an international guarantee of civil rights, including free elections and progress toward "regional federation and economic integration." This would mean a withdrawal of NATO forces as well as Russian troops, and a demilitarized Germany.

The signers of the statement, most of them second-term Congressmen, include: Hugh Addonizio and Frank Thompson (N.J.), Torbert MacDonald (Mass.), James Roosevelt (Cal.), Eugene McCarthy (Minn.), John Dingell (Mich.), Edith Green (Ore.), Thomas Ashley (Ohio), Stewart Udall (Ariz.), Charles Boyle (Ill.) and Henry Reuss (Wis.).

To date, the White House has not replied to Bulganin's communication of November 17. We have only a clue to what that reply may be—the statement of Mr. Dulles on December 19:

> There is no plan and I think there will be no suggestion in the reply [to Bulganin] that our strength in Europe will be reduced . . . I would think that if the developments in the satellite nations took such a turn that they became genuinely independent nations, that would justify a general view of the situation.

In other words, it's up to Moscow. Russia is expected to pull its troops back to its borders and set the satellites free without reciprocal troop adjustments by the West, and without even an understanding on the neutralization of the East European states.

The New Republic agrees with the Congressional signers as to the political advantage and the probable security gain were the President to take the initiative in exploring with the Russians a general settlement for Central Europe, including Germany. Further, a reply to Bulganin along

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the lines the Congressmen suggest could also open up new opportunities for controlling arms, such as:

Limited Ground Inspection. The Soviet Union and our government could immediately put into effect limited ground inspection at rail centers and airports without waiting for more extensive disarmament agreements.

Limited Aerial Inspection. The Eisenhower "Open Skies" proposal could be tried out over Central Europe or over US and Russian territory in the Arctic.

Limited Ban on Nuclear Tests. The two super-powers could agree to halt bomb tests for one or two years while we continue working for a more comprehensive arms control plan. If comprehensive agreement is not obtainable, the testing could be resumed.

Banning the ICBM Tests. Scientists assure us that ground inspectors stationed checker-board fashion every 500 miles across the Soviet Union could detect with radar any test of the 5000-mile missile. Each inspection site need be no larger than a football field.

Would the Soviet Union accept so extensive a ground inspection system? We don't know. The younger Congressmen have, at the very least, again called our attention to the need for putting the question.

What Israel Fears

ISRAELIS ARE fearful of a peace "imposed" by the United Nations, and with good reason. As matters now stand, after all foreign troops have been evacuated from Egypt the UN Secretary General will attempt to bring Arabs and Jews into direct negotiations. If these talks fail, the UN would most probably then draw up its own peace proposals which, like the 1948 Palestine partition, would be imposed upon the parties.

But since nearly half the 80 Assembly votes are considered by Israel to be prejudiced against her, such a settlement would be prejudicial to Israeli national interest. Israel's private poll of Assembly sentiment starts with the six Arab countries with whom she is still technically at war, each possessing one vote. Add nine votes of the Soviet bloc. Then add 10 countries whose populations are overwhelmingly Moslem, and whose governments have, for domestic political reasons, always been sympathetic to the Arab nations: Turkey, Iran, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indonesia. Finally, Israel takes into account the countries with large Moslem minorities, including India with 40 million Moslems. The total represents nearly half the General Assembly votes.

Israel can count on strong support from only four members of the Assembly: her two partners in the recent war, Britain and France; the US, her original sponsor; and Burma, the only Asian country with whom she has especially friendly relations.

This breakdown is, of course, subject to many variations. Iran, though Moslem, has been selling oil to Israel. Turkey, also Moslem, has had excellent relations with Israel. And the two new Moslem states, Morocco and Tunisia, are trying to stay clear of an Arab alignment.

Nevertheless, the odds against the Jews, implicit in an imposed settlement lead the Israeli Government to believe that direct negotiations are in its best interest. Israeli spokesmen are serious when they say that if they can meet Arab leaders face-to-face, the Israeli Government will show itself willing to make very substantial concessions.

Eisenhower's Request

IT IS A dark prospect for 1957 that Hans Morgenthau holds out in his much-discussed *NR* articles (December 10, 17) and in his rebuttal to critics in this issue. We share many of his misgivings, yet we continue to believe that in condemning the invasion of Egypt the United States gained new opportunities for influence in the Middle East and Asia—opportunities that may more than compensate for the temporary rift in the Western Alliance, and indeed, opportunities that the Administration recognizes in its projected Congressional request for stand-by authority to use economic and military means to deter Soviet expansion.

By voting against Britain and France the US was assuring that the Soviet Union did not become the leader of UN action against aggression, let alone sponsor of its own military adventure in Egypt's behalf. Equally important, the US demonstrated that even when its oldest friends are involved, it can be trusted to stand by the principle that international disputes cannot be settled through unilateral resort to force. In so doing, the United

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States not only gave a lift to the United Nations but won new respect in the Bandung capitals, especially New Delhi

Unfortunately, US reaction upon the discovery of this new stature in the Bandung capitals was confused at first as to just what place the Arab-Asian powers should have in our over-all foreign policy. Professor Morgenthau properly objects to the suggestion that we "exchange" the support of Britain and France for that of the Arab-Asian states. There can be no either-or choice for the US between mutually exclusive ties with the European powers and the ex-colonials. In Britain itself the "colonial" attitude is only one embattled school of thought, as the post-Suez outcry has shown us. Far from settling for a choice between one or the other, US policy must build bridges of its own.

In the immediate future, the capacity of this Administration to exploit its new opportunities will be put to practical tests in the Middle East. Will we press ceaselessly upon the Arabs that Israel is here to stay? Will we assist substantially in the economic rehabilitation and refugee resettlement that must accompany a long-range political settlement? Will we put the Soviet Union on continuing notice that we will not tolerate armed intervention?

The Administration now implies that its answer to all these questions is yes.

Aid to Poland

UNLESS the United States grants substantial long-term dollar credits to Poland, and soon, the new Gomulka regime indicates it will have to renew and extend major existing trade commitments with the Soviet Union.

As long ago as October 24, Poland asked for dollar credits, hoping to place orders in the United States totalling at least $500 million, especially for iron ore, coal mining machinery, wheat and raw cotton. But to grant Poland's request, Washington would have to overcome not only deep-seated fears of the risks in aiding any Communist regime, but also complex legal barriers—notably the Battle Act with its ban on aid to any country knowingly exporting strategic materials to the USSR.

Poland, of course, will continue to trade heavily with the Soviets, certainly in the "secondary" strategic items specified in the Battle Act. Moreover, long-term loans have been construed in the past as a form of United States economic aid, and that construction has prevented Ceylon and other nations from obtaining dollar credits. For this reason, Administration legal experts are now studying methods for advancing credit to the Poles in some form that would not collide with prohibitions in existing legislation, but would offer the Gomulka regime an escape from complete economic dependence on Moscow.

Where Do We Go?

INSPIRED BY the Democratic defeat last November, the *New York Post* has just published a series of interviews with leading "liberals" under the heading: Where Do We Go From Here? All of it is interesting, but one of the few interviewed who gives us a taste of something less flat than last week's charged water is Adlai Stevenson. For Mr. Stevenson is an old-fashioned liberal, and therefore refreshing. In him the pungent juices of liberalism have not been squeezed out, leaving us only the political pulp.

He is a lawyer who lets us understand that life often mocks the law; who says "I never care to apply labels"; who, when told that "to arouse the old fervor of the liberal movement may require programs and blueprints more ambitious than any yet offered," replies, "I am not impressed by that argument." Here is the traditional liberalism that puts attitude toward programs ahead of programs themselves. It is "liberal" as an adjective rather than "liberal" as a noun. Stevenson has definite views about definite things, but his zeal is held in check by a recollection of all the zealots in history whose influence would have been more beneficient had they been kept under tranquilizers.

The liberal temper thus reflected is curious, compassionate; delighted with diversity, skeptical of any last word. It has the improvising restlessness of Franklin Roosevelt, and something of the quality James Harvey Robinson so admired in man: our ability to go the ape one better in "monkeying around."

But does Mr. Stevenson, we wonder, share the assumption of others interviewed by the *Post* that liberals and Democrats are Siamese twins? The behavior of Democratic leadership does not seem to us to justify that assumption at this moment. The Democratic Party, like the Republican, seems to us nearly more to resemble the Bronz Zoo—complete with prowling tigers, heroic lions, lumbering elephants and chattering baboons.

NEXT WEEK

The Decade Ahead

A symposium of speculations on how the next 10 years may differ from the Cold War decade of 1946-56: Serge de Gunzburg, Joseph C. Harsch, Irving Kristol, Michael Lindsay, Richard Lowenthal, Hugh Massingham, Hans J. Morgenthau, Andre Philip and other contributors.

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The Superficial Aspect

The Last Clear Chance

AT THE New Year, traditionally the time for offering congratulations and good wishes, it is a pleasure for a superficial observer who has occasionally been critical of Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles to acknowledge that their gamble on Suez seems in a fair way to pay off.

The comparative speechlessness of Mr. Nehru during his recent visit to these shores is evidence. There was hardly a barb in all his public statements, a state of things that would hardly have been imaginable six months ago. But the United States has refused to condone aggression, even when it is committed by our friends, which cuts the ground from under the Asian suspicion that we are not so much against aggression as against Russians.

Even if those cynics are right who suspect that what spurred the President and the Secretary of State into action was their understandable wrath at the contemptuous way in which the British and French had treated them, nevertheless it is a fact that we moved to halt aggression in that part of the world in which we are believed to have some influence. We took similar steps to halt it in Hungary, too, but Hungary is in the grip of a formidable and openly unfriendly power. Hungary is not our baby in the sense that Suez is, for nobody believes that we could move the Russians by moral suasion. The significant thing is that where we had the power to act, we acted, to Mr. Nehru's obvious surprise.

But action entails responsibility. The British and French were ready to assume it, but we stopped them, so the responsibility now devolves upon us; and that consideration checks the exuberance of one's enthusiasm. Prompt and decisive action may check aggression, but ingenuity and resourcefulness must be added to promptness and decision if the responsibility attendant upon action is to be met.

Unfortunately, this Administration has been anything but conspicuous for ingenuity and resourcefulness, at home or abroad. At home it has been unable to halt the rise of either the national debt or the cost of living; and abroad, as each new problem arose, it has been able to think of nothing better than to try to repeat something that Acheson, or Marshall, or some other predecessor did in different circumstances.

The problem of the Middle East is not a repetition of the problem of Greece and Turkey, or of the Berlin blockade, or of Korea. It is new, and it is not reasonable to expect that it will yield to any of the old expedients. It requires a new solution.

The success of Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles so far is merely success in obtaining a free hand to apply a new solution if they have one. They have at least momentarily cleared us of suspicion of secretly favoring aggression except when it is perpetrated by the other side. That is good work, and they are to be congratulated on it; but it is merely preliminary to the main job, which is the discovery of a formula by which peace may be restored without tolerating aggression.

For peace is inevitable. If it is not obtained in any other way, we may rely upon it that some new Agricola will make a desert and call it peace. If that pacificator is not French, nor British, nor American, but Muscovite, it will be because none of the others could think fast enough to come up with a solution in time.

No lawyer with a tithe of Mr. Dulles' learning is ignorant of the world-famous case of the jackass and the stage-coach that established the Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance. Its substance is that in case of damage by collision the weight of responsibility rests upon the body capable of the faster movement, for it is presumed to have had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.

Recent events, including the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift and Korea, have given the United States the reputation of being capable of very rapid movement. That reputation Mr. Dulles inherited along with his office, and if he fails to sustain it world opinion will be little inclined to exonerate him. The Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance will be his undoing.

SO NEW YEAR'S congratulations and good wishes, while they are clearly due the Administration and especially the State Department, must be extended on a somewhat tentative basis. If the gentlemen in power can follow through, all well and good—more than that, all fine and dandy. The pace set in dealing with the British and French, if maintained in dealing with the Arabs and the Israeli, may reasonably be expected to establish a real and long-lasting peace in that distracted region. But it is a pace that requires such fast thinking and such driving energy as neither Mr. Eisenhower nor Mr. Dulles has habitually exhibited in the past. So the prudent citizen, offering the gentlemen felicitations in all sincerity, will yet keep in mind the Psalmist's admonition to "rejoice with trembling."

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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How 1956 Looked

to Fitzpatrick and HERBLOCK

IN THE "ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH" IN THE "WASHINGTON POST"

"Ever think of starting the motor?"

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"Now you kids beat it"

ONLY GOD CAN MAKE A TREE
THE DOG IS A NOBLE ANIMAL
M-O-T-H-E-R SPELLS MOTHER
THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME
HERBLOCK
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"Forward, Crusaders!"



"It's been charming"

"No, no, men—just the one on the end"

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

"You think they'll get rid of it, Bill?"

Flag of the oppressor

Big Suez salvage job

Southern road to nowhere

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A PROFESSORIAL DEBATE

Fashions Among the Faculty

I. It's Smart To Be a Liberal

by MORTON CRONIN

I DON'T SAY that the anguish that college professors express over the uncertain fate of academic freedom is compounded of nothing but humbug. I say simply that this anguish contains a rich element of humbug—not enough to render spurious the ideal of freedom for teachers—no degree of disingenuousness could do that—but enough to make their defense of that freedom ring from time to time with an embarrassingly false note.

The propositions that spokesmen for academic freedom stand on are these: Society has a great stake in truth; truth is elusive; the wise policy is one of wide accommodation for all important schools of thought. Fair enough. But what the appeal for academic freedom boils down to is the insistence that a college faculty have exclusive right to determine the criteria according to which it will recruit, retain, promote or discharge its members.

Now it should be obvious that the possession of this right does not automatically guarantee that a wide range of opinion will prevail on a college campus. As a matter of fact, faculties that are almost entirely self-governing, as many of them are, often generate within themselves such coercive pressures toward conformity that the range of opinion that is effectively expressed among them is decidedly narrow. It is when members of such faculties, often monuments of their local orthodoxy, rise in defense of academic freedom that the note of humbug is apt to become unmistakable. I am reminded of South American patriots who inveigh against Yankee imperialism at the same time that they perfect their domestic tyrannies—indeed, the one facilitates the other. But let me elaborate upon those head-shrinking pressures that professors bring to bear upon one another.

The atmosphere of tranquillity that rises from a sun-striped campus rarely matches the quality of life that is lived on it. Those noble trees, those placid buildings, the green grass and the ivy are a lovely façade behind which life is deeply competitive. The popular conviction that colleges are sanctuaries where men escape from the tensions of rivalry is naïvely rooted in the fact that professors give up the possibility of making much money. But money is only one counter with which human beings can measure success. There are many others, and in the academic world the contestants keep score primarily with rank, publications, and the good opinion of their colleagues. The struggle for these riches can be, and is, just as ardent as, in other contexts, the struggle for money is. Of the three measures of success for a professor the most important is the good opinion of his colleagues. The rank he achieves will usually depend chiefly upon this, and to a considerable extent even his opportunities to publish. Now for the all-important question: What provokes this good opinion? Well, too often the only magic necessary is an amiable disposition and, most crucial of all, a willingness to espouse the current prejudices of the club, whether these be social, political or merely professional.

The important unit in a college is the department. It is here that diversity of opinion is needed most, for as one passes from the subject-matter of one department to that of another the issues often change. But it is in the individual department that such diversity is most often absent. I have in mind, for instance, the Philosophy department that abounds in positivists who will not make room for an idealist or a pragmatist, except perhaps for a very tame one. Or the English faculty that will not hire a New Critic, with the possible exception of a quiet one. Or the complement in History who will not pipe aboard a scholar who does not venerate the historical fact as a pious end in itself. Or the Education professors who will not welcome a new man unless his heart is twisted into a pretzel that spells John Dewey. Or the Art department whose door opens only to individuals in a highly abstract condition. Or the Sociology department that simply will not engage an able man, no matter what his school of thought.

In this last example we have bumped against another facet of faculty-bred conformity. Freedom is not the only wallflower at these parties. Such faculties are apt to turn away from intelligence and ability too. As a matter of fact, conditions that contract freedom and

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those that depreciate intelligence are virtually identical. It is the shortest of baby steps from an insistence on no wrong opinions to an insistence on no brilliant or complicated opinions even within the limits of the orthodoxy. First of all, a really intelligent man is too likely to change his opinions. But secondly, where a faculty is free to choose its own members, it will, if it does not stick fast to principle, find irresistible the temptation to exclude men whose ability might make their colleagues uncomfortable. It is an unsettling paradox that the absence of monetary considerations, otherwise so admirable, is one of the things that makes this exclusion possible and enhances incalculably a faculty's power to nourish the human weakness for both conformity and mediocrity. No one is discernibly out of pocket if a good man is not hired. The consequences may ramify through generations of students and professors, but they will never appear in any annual report and provoke the ire of stockholders.

Such orthodoxies as positivism, progressive education, *etc.*, in respect to which individual departments often demand conformity, are more or less professional dogmas, which do not always lead inevitably to certain views concerning specific social and political questions of the day. But when the pennant of academic freedom is waved, it is usually over the right of professors to express themselves in regard to these specific questions, concerning which individuals are usually classified as radical, liberal, conservative or reactionary. I must now submit that customhouses and sentry boxes installed by professors themselves restrict the movement of ideas along these borders, too.

College departments, often colleges in their entirety, have a dismal tendency to be overwhelmingly one or another of two political complexions: They are either piously and complacently liberal, or they are stolidly and stubbornly conservative. In either case freedom is curtailed. The sins of conservatives have been meticulously diagrammed, richly mounted, and exhibited in every conceivable light. I shall confine this discussion to the tyranny of liberalism as it prevails on many campuses. Lionel Trilling merely overstated the matter when he declared, "In the United States . . . liberalism is not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition." This is especially true in the academic world because a fair definition of a conservative campus, at least if it is not sectarian, is one where controversial questions of a non-technical nature simply do not excite much discussion.

LIBERAL unanimity on a college campus would not be disturbing and it would not prejudice the struggle for academic freedom if it were just the end product of free discussion, argument and persuasion. But too often it is achieved by other means. The same conditions which promote concurrence of opinion in respect to professional



dogmas promote such concurrence in respect to social and political questions. The adoption of a liberal orientation is an important method for getting on in the academic world. A young professor has often learned as a graduate student, if not as an undergraduate, that being a liberal is very good politics. In the right environment he can, if he is not very bright, enjoy a feeling of heroic non-conformity in perfect security. He can be a dissenter in Philistia, even flirt with eventual revolution without sacrificing a single item of bourgeois comfort or status—indeed, his liberalism will consolidate his possession of these valuables.

The world of academic liberals, in short, is saturated with careerism. There is a kind of liberal who cannot conceive a greater tragedy than to lose his job or fail of promotion. When he feels, as he occasionally does when someone is sacked because of his politics, that America is no better than Russia, he is being quite sincere. For him nothing could be worse than to impede a man's advancement in the world. But this sympathy does not extend to conservatives—businessmen, professional men and publishers, for instance—whose views conflict with his. He will merrily cheer a boycott among their customers, clients and subscribers.

But there is another characteristic of campus liberals which bears upon academic freedom, and that is their moral complacence. More often than not, they are individuals who may make mistakes but who never sin—for sinning involves personal guilt and responsibility which, despite their sloganeering about the dignity of man, they do not acknowledge.

The morally complacent, since they feel that they are never *really* wrong, easily become morally authoritarian. One of the expressions of this authoritarianism has been the cry of anti-intellectualism which academic liberals have raised. Sometimes this cry is a genuine plea for freedom of thought and speech. But sometimes it sounds like nothing less than an angry insistence that America should (1) protect intellectuals from the consequences of their folly, even to the point of sparing them any loss in public esteem; (2) accept their doctrines without waiting to be convinced; (3) deliver the country's system of higher education into the hands of an autonomous, self-perpetuating academic bureaucracy, and then seal the latter off from any outside influence. All this in the name of freedom and democracy. The fact is that at the present time there is more diversity of social and politi-

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cal thought outside the academic world than there is within it.

Liberals have done superb service in scrutinizing the moral foundations of American business, with great benefits for both the society as a whole and for American business itself. But on a liberal campus a professor would feel a decided coolness in the atmosphere if he made a similar scrutiny of the practices of labor unions. And, since a closed-mouth policy prevails on most conservative campuses, the result is that labor unions receive their principal moral challenge from Westbrook Pegler.

Liberals deserve the utmost credit for subjecting to analysis and pressure the relations of the older American population with newcomers to this country. But there is only one important *minority* group in America with whose cultural imperatives they will tolerate a moral argument. That group is the Roman Catholics. Criticism of Catholicism, in fact, is more or less expected if not demanded by academic liberals and will make one's membership in their club more secure. The criticism is discreet —it rarely if ever occurs in the classroom—but it is persistent and effective. Furthermore, it is reasonable. Whether ultimately correct or not, it has raised questions which must be taken into account. Consequently, it has helped American Catholics perfect their moral position. It has enabled them to carry on an unending Socratic dialogue. But Catholics are the only minority group that receives this salutary service. Paul Blanshard's *American Freedom and Catholic Power* enjoyed a deservedly wide circulation among academic liberals. But substitute for the word *Catholic* the name of any other minority group in America and see how illiberal the title will sound. Insofar as the main stream of American intellectual life is concerned liberals have consigned the other minorities to a moral vacuum.

BUT the strangest symptom which afflicts the typical campus liberal, and the one that has embarrassed the cause of academic freedom most acutely in our day, is the discomfort which he exhibits when confronted with an outspoken critic of Communism, however intellectual that critic may be. I am certain that there are not many Communists in the academic world. How could there be? There are not many in the whole United States. I myself have never met, on a campus or off, one person who I felt certain was a member of the Communist Party. But if we disregard what is said in the classroom, where Communism is seldom discussed, and consider only what professors say to one another, here are some statements that are too often true in departments and on campuses ruled by liberals: It is infinitely easier in these environs to denounce Joseph McCarthy than it is to denounce Joseph Stalin (at least until recently). It is easier to belt Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee than it is to abuse any Russian or Red Chinese leader. It is easier to hammer on American foreign policy in general than it is to defend it, but especially at those points where it is most militantly anti-Communist. It is safer to sympathize with Alger Hiss than with Ezra Pound. It is more politic to respect Robert Hutchins, heretofore no idol of liberals, than Sidney Hook, a rugged centurion of liberalism but queasy about Communists. In fact, about the only evidence that will convince many liberals that an individual is *soft* toward Communism is conclusive evidence that the individual *is* a Communist, does not regret it, and has no intention of leaving the Party in the foreseeable future.

WHEN reproached for his failure to criticize Communism and his distaste for listening to such criticism, an academic liberal will retort: "Just because I don't shout about Communism doesn't mean that I think Communists should be coddled." That depends. If a scholar is not interested in politics, this defense is a good one. But if he is the shouting type, as many liberals are, then his silences are significant. They at least signify—and where the average liberal is concerned this is all they signify—that he has absorbed willy-nilly the convention that it is not in good taste to be a vigorous and outspoken critic of Communism. This convention developed momentum in the 'thirties and 'forties and now roars through the academic world largely out of sheer inertia. The average liberal professor has probably never shaken hands with an actual Communist. Furthermore, he may count among his friends various of his conservative colleagues. But where our liberal represents the ruling sentiment in his department or college, his conservative friends are too apt to keep their conservatism to themselves, satisfied with the occasional statement that they are not ashamed of being black. They know on what conditions the atmosphere will remain friendly and when it will turn ugly. The Uncle Toms know their place, and the result once again is that the liberals largely succeed in relegating an important Socratic dialogue, this one with Communism, to the least intellectual segments of the population. They themselves are chiefly responsible for McCarthyism.

The sins of academic conservatives against free inquiry may be as numerous and grievous as those of liberals. Furthermore, departments and colleges ruled by conservatives abound in America, even though they are more likely to be small, obscure, and less important in setting the tone of American intellectual life than those where liberals proliferate. But my subject has been freedom, and the extent to which the professions of one of these groups—the one that regards itself as preeminently the protector of academic freedom—matches its practice in respect to that commodity.

One reason the public has responded sluggishly to the cry of academic freedom is that it has sensed the ideological unanimity that exists in many academic

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circles. That unanimity, only possible among intellectuals where clubbiness, self-interest, and conformism enter the picture, converts professors into just another pressure group bent on freedom for the sake of power instead of freedom for the sake of truth. If professors made better use of their own opportunities to promote effective debate on all important questions—within the individual department and college, where all contestants can confront one another—the public might find it easier to stomach Communists, confident that their conspiratorial techniques will not work.

The objective circumstances which nourish conformity, discussed earlier in this article, are formidable indeed. But they can be conquered if enough professors decide, as David Riesman would say, that henceforth they are going to be inner-directed. The traditions of individual freedom and responsibility still exist around which they can integrate themselves. In fact, they pay lip service to them—a not entirely useless kind of service—all the time. They need only prevent their devotion to them from becoming so incandescent that the light blinds them to the reality it is supposed to illuminate.

II. "The Devil It Is!"

by IRVING HOWE

MR. CRONIN'S main point seems to be something like this: Liberals, just because they are committed to democratic values and occupy so prominent a place in the American universities, are most in need of moral self-scrutiny. They should beware of the smugness of their virtue; they must guard against the "repressive impulse" (as Lionel Trilling calls it) that may be lurking behind their militant claims to enlightenment.

Now it is hard to disagree with a warning against the possible righteousness of one's rightness. It is also hard to know what to do with one's agreement. Warnings against righteousness are like sermons against sin. Though I enjoy my modest share of sin, I hope, when the final roll is called, to be counted among its opponents. But if I can't quite tell what is happening in the preacher's mind, I want at least to know in which direction his finger is pointing. And I want to listen carefully, to hear whether warnings against pride are being spoken in accents of pride. Mr. Cronin does not strike me as a St. Francis.

Mr. Cronin presents his indictment of liberal professors in the rhetoric of liberal self-chastisement; but when one looks a bit closely at the specifications of his argument, it becomes clear that he is really a neo-conservative guerrilla in academic robes. For if half of what he says is true, then we liberals and radicals (I propose a temporary united front against Mr. Cronin) had better close shop and admit that the *National Review* is right. Liberalism is open to deep criticism and I, for one, have tried to make some of it; but things are not quite so bad as Mr. Cronin would have you suppose. Not even half of what he says is true.

That academic life can be petty, mean, anxious, competitive; that some professors, like many other people, feel uneasy in the company of brilliant colleagues; that there is a drift in the universities, as in all institutions, toward the psychology of self-approval—none of these quite comes to a remarkable discovery, especially when advanced in the free-floating generalities that Mr. Cronin favors.

But, let us grant it, there is *something* to what he says. The question then arises: what is the necessary connection between such faults of academic life and the faults of liberalism? Skating from phrase to phrase, Mr. Cronin never so much as asks himself this question. Instead, he presents a string of assertions as if the mere fact of their sequence were evidence of causality. For even if academic life were what Mr. Cronin says it is and liberals were a dominant force in the large American universities, it would still constitute an elementary error in logic to assume that the one is due to the other. Had Mr. Cronin been seriously concerned with investigating a problem rather than throwing spitballs at liberals, he would have had to note that:

1. All institutional life, if only in order to perpetuate itself, tends to generate inner patterns of conformity and complacence. This is true regardless of the ideological bias—liberal, conservative, radical—that may dominate a given institution. To show that liberalism in any significant way helps to speed or intensify such a trend would require analysis of the *specific* nature of American liberalism today. Such evidence might well be available; but Mr. Cronin is too concerned with large blinding thrusts (or large blinding phrases) to be able to find it.

2. Professors may not earn as much money as they think they should, and they may not be as consciously motivated to live by the dollar as are other people; but most of them remain subject to the mores and imbued with the values of a commercial society. It is therefore at least possible that much of what Mr. Cronin finds disagreeable in the academic world needs to be related

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

not to liberalism or any other political opinion but to the encompassing pressures of the commercial ethos. While not in any strict sense a liberal myself, I think it only fair to add whatever resistance the commercial ethos meets in the American universities today comes mainly from scholars still faithful to the tradition of liberalism.

3. During the past few decades there has grown up a severe crisis in American education, among the symptoms of which are the difficulty of providing competent faculties for expanding colleges, the virtual impossibility of teaching ill-prepared and indifferent students, and a general lowering of intellectual standards. Much of the complacence and mediocrity that Mr. Cronin finds in the universities, particularly in those large universities supposedly cursed with liberal faculties, is actually due to this problem of mass education. To hold liberals or any other political group responsible for the manifestations of this crisis is sheer intellectual blindness.

Given the pressures of mass education, the truth about most universities seems to me quite different from what Mr. Cronin suggests. Far from driving potential T. S. Eliots away from their doors, most English departments that I happen to know are competing fiercely if politely for the distinguished men in the field. For one quickly discovers that to stay intellectually alive in the academic world requires stimulating colleagues, even if, heaven forbid, they happen to be New Critics or critics of John Dewey. And then, you know, there *are* at least a few disinterested scholars, some of them even liberals, who feel that getting a new and gifted colleague, even one who may outshine them, constitutes good news. I know how naïve this will seem by comparison with Mr. Cronin's worldliness; but I take the risk.

4. Most university teachers, far from being rabid liberals who intimidate heretics and keep them away from the good jobs, are usually indifferent to politics. Whatever interest they do show in it tends to be casual and intermittent. (They don't even love Adlai very madly.) For that matter, a large number of university teachers are not intellectuals at all: they are specialists, mental technicians, who do a job well or poorly but are seldom infused with the liberal fervor (or think it useful from opportunist motives to simulate the liberal fervor) which Mr. Cronin, in order to have any case at all, must assume to exist. In most universities there just isn't the political intensity that would make plausible the political favoritism that Mr. Cronin insinuates.

"The adoption of a liberal orientation," he writes, "is an important method for getting on in the academic world." The devil it is! If you really want to get ahead, forget about liberalism and grind out those articles for *PMLA*.

Besides, there are still some honest men left in this world, and a number of them are even chairmen of university departments. The head of an English department in a Midwestern university—one of those supposedly crawling with liberals—will seldom know about the politics of the young instructors, first because he is likely to be making every effort to play fair, second because he doesn't really care, and third because with so many young instructors cluttering up the place his initial problem is to remember their names.

5. Perhaps most crucial to this discussion is the fact that American liberalism, just because it seems fair to have become "not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition," can no longer command a compact body of ideas or even attitudes. What kind of liberals will you find in the average large university? A handful of ADA people, most of them far from firebrands; *perhaps* one liberal of the sort who feels a nostalgic attachment to Popular Frontism; a group for whom liberalism has become a vague commitment to decency, social legislation and the Democratic ticket (though recently a good number of these have found it possible to switch to Ike); and another group for whom liberalism is little more than a euphemism for American citizenship. To speak about that single Popular Front relic as if he were typical of American liberalism today is absurd; to speak about American liberalism as if it were a homogeneous political tendency is absurd; to say that any significant number of American liberals, in or out of the universities, remains "soft" on Communism is absurd. That makes three kinds of absurdity, all together.

As a reporter of academic life Mr. Cronin also manages to be comic. His picture of a professor suffering from "a decided coolness in the atmosphere" because he had been critical of trade unions is enough to wring John Chamberlain's heart; but it ain't so, it doesn't happen. For most academic liberals now go out of their way to disclaim any identification with the workers or their unions; they all too easily (almost as if they were candidates for the Presidency!) equate "big business" with "big unionism," regarding both as a menace and trying to find themselves a political-moral stance above the sordid clash of pressure groups.

Where, one wonders, did Mr. Cronin get his weird picture of the American universities in 1956? Surely not from direct observation; no one, merely by looking, could brew such a fantasy as his academic liberal "flirting with eventual revolution"; mistakes of this magnitude

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require guidance. I think I know the answer: he has been reading too many satiric novels by Mary McCarthy and taking them for fact.

That Mr. Cronin is as malicious a critic of liberalism as he is untrustworthy a reporter of academic life seems to me so obvious as to require only a few remarks:

Liberals, he tells us, "may make mistakes, but . . . never sin—for sinning involves personal guilt and responsibility which . . . they do not acknowledge." Now the term "sin," if used seriously, must immediately bring us to a theological context. Whether or not Mr. Cronin knows what he is saying, his sentence means that only persons with religious faith are capable of assuming personal guilt and responsibility. But this is an opinion so arrogant and impudent as to stagger belief: it dismisses a whole class of human beings ("liberals") from the realm of serious moral life. It is also sheer cant. For while a sense of sin certainly can involve personal guilt and responsibility, it is also true that men can feel personal guilt and responsibility without a sense of sin.

The liberals, Mr. Cronin goes on to say, "largely succeed in relegating an important Socratic dialogue, this one with Communism, to the least intellectual segments of the population. They themselves are chiefly responsible for McCarthyism." What simplicity of mind! Mr. Cronin is only a baby step (as he would put it) from a crude conspiracy theory of history. Yes, yes: the liberals are chiefly responsible for McCarthyism; McCarthy is chiefly responsible for the Communists; the Communists are chiefly responsible for the liberals; the liberals are chiefly responsible for the Communists. Mr. Cronin should be in institutional advertising.

Now that I have almost finished, I ask myself whether it has been worth the trouble. Certainly not for the arguments advanced by Mr. Cronin, which are neither original nor interesting. It's the style, I tell myself, that frisky souped-up jaunty assured style—it's the style that holds one's attention and makes one feel more desperate than the argument.

Consider, for example, the sentence about the education professors who won't hire a new man "unless his heart is twisted into a pretzel that spells John Dewey." Vivid! But why, one asks oneself, why a pretzel? Why not a banana or a bagel that spells John Dewey? Or the sentence claiming that the "convention that it is not in good taste to be a vigorous or outspoken critic of Communism" proceeded to develop "momentum in the thirties and forties and now *roars* through the academic world largely out of sheer inertia." I pass by the problem of how a convention (at least of this kind) can roar; I put aside the equally interesting problem of how it can roar "out of sheer inertia." (Try it, though, as a muscular exercise.) I prefer to leave it with the academic people who read *The New Republic*: do you think it truthful or accurate to say that the opinion that it is in bad taste to criticize Communism is today *roaring* through the American universities?

Well, American liberalism needs severe and sustained criticism; so does academic life; and so do the academic liberals. But Mr. Cronin isn't the man for the job. Not even if he were to twist himself into a pretzel.

Pronouncements Are Not Policies

A Reply to Readers' Comments on "American Foreign Policy"

by HANS J. MORGENTHAU

THE COMMENTS on my articles on American foreign policy, published in *The New Republic* of December 10 and 17, have raised three fundamental issues: the likelihood of atomic war, the usefulness of the United Nations, and the chances for the United States to exchange the support of Great Britain and France for that of the Asian-African bloc.

I never shared the belief, widespread after the Geneva Conference of 1955, that atomic war had become impossible. In an article "Has Atomic War Really Become Impossible?" published in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* of January, 1956, I tried to show that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would deliberately start such a war, but that either might stumble into one through miscalculation. "If one side were to push the other into defeat, in reliance upon the latter's resolution not to start an all-out atomic war, it might provoke that very war. If one side were to declare that under no circumstances would it resort to all-out atomic war, it would condemn itself to a policy of appeasement, inviting defeat after defeat and issuing either in impotence or an all-out atomic war fought in desperation under the

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most unfavorable conditions. The United States and the Soviet Union must face the paradox that their chance to avoid all-out atomic war resides in their willingness and ability to fight it."

THESE risks, created by the objective conditions under which the great nations of the world face each other, are not to be avoided by acting on the assumption that if you act as though those conditions did not exist they will somehow cease to exist. This was the prevailing mood in the Western world in the fall of 1938, and we know now that, while it seemed to minimize the risk of war, it actually maximized it. The risk of war, arising not from the intentions of men but from the objective conditions of their existence, can only be met successfully by acknowledging the conditions and manipulating them with courage and resourcefulness for the sake of peace.

It is but another manifestation of the "Chamberlain syndrome" to substitute the moral force of world public opinion, as expressed through the United Nations, for the traditional methods of foreign policy. This is not the place to prove, as I have done elsewhere (*Politics Among Nations*, chapter 17), that such a world public opinion does not and cannot exist as an efficient restraining force in the contemporary world. Obviously, world opinion has not saved the life of a single Hungarian, nor would it have compelled Great Britain, France and Israel to retreat from Egypt had it not been for the combined pressure of the United States and the Soviet Union.

To say this is not to imply that the United Nations has no useful function to perform for the peaceful solution of international conflicts. It only implies that the United Nations cannot be used as an alternative to foreign policies pursued by individual nations. The real alternative is between national policies pursued through the United Nations and those pursued by individual governments on their own. The Charter of the United Nations is a statement of general principles and aspirations and specific procedures, but not of concrete policies. Those policies must be supplied by the individual members. The justice and practicality of these policies is not predetermined by the Charter, but is rather the result of their effect upon each other in terms of the preservation of order, peace and the freedom and welfare of the individual nations. It has been the besetting sin of American foreign policy in recent years to have confused general moral pronouncements and procedural references to the United Nations with substantive policies.

It has been suggested that we have a new substantive foreign policy, promising of success, in our recent support of the Asian-African bloc. The correctness of this suggestion is open to serious doubt on three grounds.

First, we like to think of the Asian-African bloc as a combination of nations who are united in common policies derived from a common desire for social justice and national independence. I used to share this view and give eloquent expression to it until first-hand acquaintance with a number of these nations opened my eyes to its falsity. We have looked at Asia and Africa in terms of the Western pattern of liberal reform and national liberation and thereby completely distorted the political, social and moral reality. In most of these countries, political consciousness does not exist below a very thin layer of feudal rulers, military leaders, professional politicians and intellectuals. These political elites are united in fear and hatred of the West and in respect for material power, but not in concrete, let alone constructive, common policies. The results of the Bandung Conference are illustrative in this respect.

A policy which attempts to make the United States "popular" with these elites by catering to their prejudices or by exerting pressure through "moral force" is foredoomed to failure. For here even more than elsewhere it is not the appearance of weakness but a "position of strength" which is the foundation for political success. For this reason one cannot help being pessimistic about the chances of the United States to bring about a viable settlement in the Middle East as long as its policy remains what it is.

Second, the suggestion assumes that the United States is at liberty to change its associations at will. As a matter of fact, this is not the case. The alliance with Great Britain and France is not a matter of preference, but of fundamental self-interest, that is, of necessity, to be altered only at the risk of irreparable damage to the national interest. Thus the United States may be able for one ill-conceived moment to shift its support from Great Britain and France to that of the Asian-African bloc. But, as recent events have shown, it cannot for long remain oblivious to the objective logic of its interests. Therefore, whatever advantages the United States may have gained by such a shift are bound to be fleeting and unsubstantial.

Finally, the suggestion assumes that the only obstacle which stands in the way of an American policy supporting the Asian-African bloc is American support for Great Britain and France. Again this is not the case. What separates the United States from the Asian-African bloc is not primarily its support of Great Britain and France but its own position in the world and its policies on behalf of it. The United States has become the most powerful Western nation, succeeding in many respects to the position and interests which Great Britain and France held and defended in times past. It is this fact, manifesting itself in alliances, bases, policies, and the sheer manifestation of overwhelming military and economic power, which is resented in Asia and Africa. And again, it is the task of statesmanship not to ignore that fact but to manipulate it on behalf of the interests of the United States.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

"What is the Answer?...What is the Question?"

by Christopher Sykes

WHY Mr. Barzun calls his book "The Energies of Art" is anyone's guess. Here is mine. The impulses which go to the making of great painting, literature, and musical composition have, so far, entirely eluded analysis. It can of course be shown, with a fair degree of certainty, what parts of the mind and emotional instinct are engaged in the act of artistic "creation"—but as to why some practitioners can transform the mind of men with what they achieve, while others cannot, no man knows. What is beyond dispute is that the production of great art does not follow any devisable set of laws: the constant idea behind Mr. Barzun's able and learned essays is that it depends on something outside the scope of criticism.

This elusive something he presumably calls energy, but the word alone tells us nothing. Energy means ability to act, and ultimately "work." "An infinite capacity for taking pains"? The evidence is that some dunces have had this rare gift, and that some undoubted men of genius have been without it. So artistic energy must refer to a form of action before which man must reverently confess ignorance, and of which the critic must never pretend to know the secret. The ordinary critic invariably does pretend just that, and Mr. Barzun gives him a bad time. The essays of this critic have as an underlying theme, the inadequacy and futility of criticism when confronted by great invention.

The Energies of Art, by Jacques Barzun (Harper; $5).

It is strange to be reminded that one of the groans of Henry James was that there was a scarcity of critics in his day. It was an absurd misjudgment. The great artists of the world have had to get along with next to none at all. The criticism that met Homer must have been very crude stuff, and we know the sort of prejudiced pedantry that Shakespeare and Bach were treated to. The meticulous ultra-sensitive magnifying glass scrutiny which James might have afforded them is unlikely to have helped them; the evidence is that the coarse impact of power on the general state of mind of the day is, in most cases, more stimulating.

Mr. Barzun sees the present lofty position of the critic as imperilled by an imminent swing in contemporary ideas. The critic is likely to fall soon from his present high perch. If he does it may not only be due to his feeble record in the discernment of genius among his contemporaries, but to the disturbing fact that, so far as the giants are concerned, the general run of stupid people have a much better critical record. Tolstoy, Thackeray, and Dickens have never lacked for readers among ordinary people; it was only in sophisticated and brilliant society that you used to hear

The Second-Fated

MY STUTTER, my cough, my unfinished sentences,
Denote an inveterate physical reluctance
To use the metaphysical idiom.
Forgive me: what I am saying is, perhaps this:—

Your accepted universe, by Jove's naked hand
Or Esmun's, or Odomankoma's, or Marduk's—
Choose which name jibes—formed scientifically
From whatever there was before Time was,
And begging the question of perfect consequence,
May satisfy the general run of men
(If 'run' be an apt term for patent paralytics)
That blueprints destine all they suffer here,
But does not satisfy certain few else.

Fortune enrolled me among the second-fated
Who have read their own obituaries in *The Times*,
Have heard 'Where, death, thy sting? Where, grave, thy victory?'
Intoned with unction over their still clay,
Have seen two parallel red-ink lines drawn
Under their manic-depressive bank accounts,
And are therefore strictly forbidden to walk in grave-yards
Lest they scandalize the sexton and his bride.

We, to be plain with you, taking advantage
Of a brief demise, visited first the Pit,
A library of shades, completed characters;
And next the silver-bright Hyperborean Queendom,
Basking under the sceptre of Guess Whom?,
Where pure souls matrilineally foregather.
We were then shot through by merciful lunar shafts
Until hearts tingled, heads sang, and praises flowed;
And learned to scorn your factitious universe
Ruled by the death which we had flouted;
Acknowledging only that from the Dove's egg hatched
Before aught was, but wind—unpredictable
As our second birth would be, or our second love:
A moon-warmed world of discontinuance.

ROBERT GRAVES

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them being run down. During his forty-year eclipse congregations of dull folk listened joyfully to Bach in Leipzig, Sunday after Sunday. Before the present acclaim it was always difficult to get a good seat for a Wagner Opera anywhere, though you did not till recently meet the best people there. It is only among persons of "keen critical mind" that I have heard Beethoven disparaged. Mozart enjoys a very good all-round press today, but 100 years ago it was all the fashion to consider him a fatuous little fellow, a fashion which led Thackeray into an atrocious gaffe in *The Virginians*. A little-known English, or rather Anglo-American masterpiece of fiction is Howard Overing Sturgis' *Belchamber*, published in England shortly before World War I. The reason that it is little-known is that its original success was stifled when persons of taste heard that Henry James was to be seen wagging his head sorrowfully and moaning over poor Sturgis. The reason Henry James disapproved was that poor Sturgis' masterly novel took no account of Jacobean rules and formulae. I hope it is not improper to say in an American paper that Henry James, as a critic, was as bad as the worst of them. He dared to plan and fix up blueprints for the mysterious energies.

These thoughts on the value of criticism come to me after reading what seems to me the best of Mr. Barzun's essays: "From the Shakespeare File." I have a quarrel with this essay nonetheless. Mr. Barzun should not have made mock of Matthew Arnold's famous line "Others abide our question, thou art free," because what he does is to explore Arnold's theme and prove the merit of his fine utterance. There are thousands of books on Shakespeare, and, as Logan Pearsall Smith said, "most of them are mad." This is not because they are written by lunatics but because of all elusive and inspired men Shakespeare is the most treacherously enticing to those who would judge. With all his manifold imperfections this Will o' the Wisp beckons the critics on, and all but a very few sink into quagmires of ineptitude. Mr. Barzun points out, with great perspicacity, that while all critics of Shakespeare make formal protestations of faith and worship, a careful examination of what they say shows an inherent hostility to this poet who defies the regulations. The relationship between Shakespeare and his critics, supposedly that of Holy Grail and protecting knight, usually degenerates into that of disorderly drunk and policeman. The latter, in his critical heart, would prefer to have to do with a law-abiding mediocrity.

MR. BARZUN'S range is enormous. He writes about Goethe, Byron, Swift, Stendhal, Theophile Gautier, Hardy, Bagehot, Henry James as Melodramatist (a splendid essay), Bernard Shaw (for whom he shows unexpected hero-worship), William James (I couldn't follow him here), and detective fiction. The last essay is a very interesting analysis of the position of the whodunnit in contemporary letters, and in it the author asserts that the golden age of detection is over. I agree. I would like to point out one great and I think fatal weakness in detective fiction not noticed by Mr. Barzun. I have consulted policemen and other authorities and I am assured that private detectives (the mainstay of the thing whatever people may say), are little-known outside divorce proceedings and have never played any important role in major criminal investigation. In other words there are no Sherlocks, and never have been. This means that a form of literature which professes realism is in fact disguised romance of the wildest make-belief kind. This is a serious malady and an early death is inevitable.

It is rare to read about Shakespeare and Conan Doyle in the same book, but the variety of Mr. Barzun is not mere disorder. The reader can feel the presence of a common theme throughout these essays on varied subjects, but the manner is esoteric, sometimes incompetently so, and it is difficult to be quite sure what the theme is. I have suggested what it may be.

The Charge of the Heavy Brigade

by David Ray

WE have often heard mourned the lack of a poet laureate. Now, rising to fill the vacuum is a true chanter of songs—Dennis Tenney, with his eighty-seven pages of "simple imagery and quotable lines . . . meant for popular consumption by ordinary folks." His book of poems, all praising the winner of the recent Presidential election, "reveals America's own King Arthur in all his splendor and glory and builds a poetical shrine about a great man whose spirit and influence will affect many generations to come." The cover shows Ike himself with his famous smile and his sateen tie.

The Song of Eisenhower, by Dennis Tenney (Whittier; $2.50).

The dedication declares:

> This book is meant,
> Dear President,
> To bring you cheer
> And make it clear—
> We are sincere,
> Who love, revere!

Other economiums include the poem, "The Man," here offered in its entirety:

> Oh, man of God so fine and great,
> You honor us to guide our State!

The poet leaves no doubt of the sanctity of the central figure:

> He's the greatest
> Since
> The Christ Child's birth!

The poet declares

> . . . A greater General
> Than Napoleon
> More resourceful than Caesar! . . .
> He stands
> Where the Christ once stood—

But he goes on to declare that part of Ike's greatness is that he has never known failure of any kind, and he does not turn the other cheek:

> If need, you call the tyrant's bluff
> And make him think you're awfully tough!

Ike, "the man that God has sent," has a "saintly task."

> . . . only you can make the peace
> And joy to all mankind release.

Finally,

> Dwight—He's Next on Rushmore's Peak—

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The lyrics have villains too—their identities are only delicately hinted, but we can infer that Mr. Tenney is thinking of those like Mr. Stevenson:

> Our tragedy, O Eisenhower,
> Is mostly those who'd seize the power
> That you now hold and use the same
> For foolish ends—and the world to shame.

I do not know why Mr. Tenney chose to print this volume privately: the subject matter gives it best-selling potentiality. Insider-its acceptance might help it outsell *The Outsider, Life* might have run a special section for it (still might).

As a matter of fact, the poet ends his book with a song (complete with music and to be sung "brightly with spirit") which could replace the National Anthem:

> All hail to Eisenhower
> Whose name is filled with power!

The President, as the author goes on to point out,

> . . . goes to church
> Where Quakers meet who use the birch
> On boys who fail to say their prayers;
> For strength he likes all sports affairs.

England had her Tennyson: at last we have our Tenney.

The Radical in the Gray Flannel Suit

by James T. Farrell

THERE are more ways than one of losing the sense of history, and even the memory of much of the history of our own times. History does not always have to be rewritten for this to happen: it can merely be forgotten. Too many statesmen, journalists, and even professors think and speak of history as something set apart from us, a force outside of man, an impartial arbiter which sets all accounts straight, renders just verdicts on the actions of men, and rewards the good, the just and the wise while discrediting the evil, the unjust and the unwise. These notions would be excellent but for one reason. They are nonsense. In other words, we have too many people who, while we are in the heat of battle, pass on to posterity the task of judging.

Nine Lives for Labor, by Richard D. Kelly (Praeger; $3).

Besides the appeal to history of the plaster cast species of Pericles, there is the sheer simple forgetting of what has happened. There are those who take credit for the achievements and the sacrifices of others. I am thinking of the publicity agents, and of some eminent business men who are making a philosophy of economics and a bad poem of the future out of some new labels—"capitalism with a conscience," "people's capitalism," "the New Conservatism." In *Time Magazine*, November 26, 1956, there is a two-page spread titled "The New Conservatism," "A Bold Creed for Modern Capitalism." The article begins:

"Where is the real radical, the real revolutionary to be found in the US today?" One answer comes from Mr. Neil J. Curry, American Trucking Associations President. "Behind the desk of any business establishment." What Mr. Curry says may be true for all I know. But even if true, such statements are on a parallel with an imaginary statement an imaginary literary critic might make to the effect that Herman Wouk, more than, say, Theodore Dreiser, is the pioneering father of the modern American novel.

For all I know, this imaginary assertion may be true. At least Mr. Wouk's heirs will have more income tax troubles than did the late Helen Dreiser when Dreiser died. But let us have a sense of proportion. Before today, there was yesterday. And what is today has emerged out of yesterday's history.

I DO not claim off-hand that the people's capitalists, the men behind the desks of any business establishment, and Mr. Curry are either unworthy or unrevolutionary. If credit is what they want, who am I to object if they get the credit. Omar, who is due for a possible revival thanks to Colonel Nasser, advised "Ah, take the cash and let the credit go." The people's capitalists can have the cash and a lot of credit. And I shall not object if the NAM or even the Congress should establish an Order of Jay Gould, an Order of Mellon, an Order of Rockefeller, an Order of Kohler, or an Order of United Piece Dye Works and bestows it on the real radicals and the revolutionaries behind the desk.

BUT a historical question is—how did we get to this present state of boundless prosperity, revolutionaries on the board of directors, real radicals in management who are interested in the welfare of their workers, bankers who believe in social security, and corporation presidents who believe that their corporations, unlike the Athens of Pericles and the Roman empire, are eternal? It is with this question in mind that I have alluded to history. The social changes, the changes in the attitudes of some business men, and of the ghost writers and public relations counsellors of other business men resulted from social conflict, struggles, sacrifices. But to put this into publicity statements would be controversial, even though it is historically true. And the historical facts which precede the present dispensation are important today because with all of the vistas of the future, there is still some unfinished business to attend to in the democracy of the present. Human rights have not achieved absolute priority over property rights. It is possible that after the paternalism of Pullman is forgotten, a new and grandiose paternalism will be created. And it is possible that, with due recognition to the contribution of business men, this publicity, this soaring idealism, this concept of the eternal man behind the desk might be part of a political build up as well as a prospectus of the day when there might be three helicopter hangers for the Joe at the machine. Let's try to keep our sense of balance.

This is a long prelude to introduce a book, but there are things which must be said, and said now. And my introduction is no disservice to Richard Kelly's book *Nine Lives for Labor*. Kelly formerly worked for Walter Reuther as a phamphleteer, speech writer and publicist; he also had a tour of duty with the government overseas. But writing has been in his heart, and he writes well. Here he has made a study of nine among the thousands who have

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lived, fought, died in the effort, also to produce what we now call in the new age of hope, "a better tomorrow." This book is about labor. And there are insufficient books about labor and the labor movement. The significance, the changes, the complexity, the variety of men who have been or still are in the labor movement is not sufficiently written about. Knowledge of the labor movement has not become widely enough disseminated in America. The vote of labor has not been fully explored. And all of this is part of the history of our time.

Kelly does not write of statistics, the structure of the labor movement, or of the dramatic strikes which are usually and quite naturally thought of when we think of labor history. He tells the story of nine people whose lives were given to organizing, agitating, negotiating, building up the textile workers. Labor often advances or declines as a result of how it fares in strikes. But what do men do who organize, build unions, negotiate, conduct the day by day work of the unions. Kelly writes about these people. He has written a new book which gives an added knowledge and awareness of labor movement.

Especially in the case of one of these nine men, Herb Payne, the reader will also possibly grasp the points I am stressing here. In terms of the statements of "the new Conservatism," the present patterns of labor-management, the techniques of bargaining, and even much of what is considered the new vision came not from behind the desk but outside the mill and the shop, in the union hall, in trade union offices, and on the other side of the bargaining table.

In the case of Herb Payne this was essentially so. For he developed into an expert negotiator, learned about health conditions, and many aspects of the textile industry. He learned so much about it that he even contributed to technical journals. And there are the other eight, old timers Mariano, a Portuguese, Corporal Joe Steiner who fought against Aguinaldo and then became a textile worker and organizer. Here, briefly, is a side of the labor movement, its history, and some of its unsung heroes and organizers which does not get into headlines. But their lives are important. What they did day by day helped to create a time when the worker has not only more pay but more dignity. And as we consider the present, let us not forget. For insofar as there is a developing new vision, these eight men and one woman and many like them contributed to it.

Emil Rieve, General President, Textile Workers Union of America, AF of L-CIO contributes an introduction to the book. He points out that in the South the textile workers remain largely unorganized, and are "the economic problem of the nation." Further, he states that "all the trappings of 19th Century labor relations are still a part of 20th Century life in the largest basic industry of the nation." These include "police surveillance, false arrest, dismissals, blacklisting, labor injunctions, gunfire."

Oh you radicals behind the desk, oh you publicity men of the people's capitalism, read Dick Kelly and go South, go South, young men!

The Personality-Tested

by Michael D. Reagan

IN his new book, Mr. Whyte sees the Protestant Ethic, (which legitimized aggressive action by the individual against the group) as rapidly being replaced by the Social Ethic. This new ethic authorizes, indeed glorifies, the pressures of our large-scale organizations against the individual. Its function is to give organization man—the middle class managers who are the "mind and soul of our great self-perpetuating institutions"—a rationale for surrendering himself to the compulsions of an hierarchic life in which the individual is the means to the goals of the group.

The Organization Man, by William H. Whyte Jr. (Simon & Schuster; $5).

In tracing organization man from his college days through his recruitment by a corporation and his life as business manager or engineer or academician, and in all cases as suburbanite, Whyte argues with a wealth of fascinating detail that the tyranny of the group has gone very far indeed. Most appalling is the evidence that organization man is not only submitting, but has persuaded himself that his submission is a moral imperative.

"Belongingness" is the primary human need as organization man sees himself. To belong to the group, to be adjusted, is his Nirvana of the here and now. And the goals of the group are immaterial. So strong is this urge, Whyte reports, that in his role as parent the new man supports an educational system which centers on "life-adjustment" training and has only disdain for the liberal academic disciplines. This despite the fact that their suburban environment has already made the children experts in "other-directedness" by the time they enter kindergarten. One parent is quoted as asserting that her children were "certainly getting a broad view of things" because her sixth grader was studying ads and discounts in a marketing course.

The author is an angry man. He is particularly repulsed by the anti-intellectual vocationalism of the schools and colleges, by the extent to which mediocrity is preferred over brillance in corporation scientists because mediocre men adjust better, and by the increased use of personality testing in which loyalty to the group is the quality most sought, not ability in the job. (To get back at the testers, he includes an appendix showing "How to Cheat on Personality Tests.")

A readable study of organizational compulsions in modern industrial society is long overdue, and Whyte's book fills the gap admirably in many ways. Although discursive and occasionally pretentious, it is also highly entertaining and informative. But despite the passionate tone of Whyte's concluding call to arms against The Organization, the book is less disturbing than it might—and I would add, should—be.

Because he doesn't ask why the group ethic has come to seem essential, why submissiveness is so widely accepted, Whyte is able to offer the simple solution of an act of will. "The fault is not in organization," he writes; "it is in

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our worship of it." All we have to do is cease worshipping.

But what if the compulsions are built into the technological-economic-political system that we call modern industrialism? Then an act of will will not suffice. And it is at least possible to argue that, for example, increased specialization of function and the spread of hierarchic forms of organization carry with them the rule of most by a few.

To such problems as these Whyte offers no solutions. No one else does either, to my knowledge, but some have begun to explore the structural problem.

Since large-scale organization is unlikely to disappear in the near future, our efforts might better be directed at devising new forms of organization which may minimize the need for compulsive loyalty to the group, than at exhorting ourselves to fight with valor but in vain against the mechanism of the existing system.

Justice Stone's Court

by William Rogers

HARLAN FISKE STONE'S twenty years on the bench were in many ways the most exciting in Supreme Court history. The tribunal was never closer to live national issues. Its opinions were never so much a matter of public debate. Never before or since did its decisions on the constitutionality of Federal legislation precipitate open attack by the President. Stone was a central figure in all the acts of this historic and fateful drama.

Shortly after his appointment in 1925, he fell under the sway of the intellect and personal warmth of Brandeis and Holmes. They formed a triumvirate of dissenters challenging the judicial obstructionism of the other justices in case after case. Later, it was Stone who in two famous dissents laid the precise legal foundation on which Justice Roberts could build for the majority in his timely switch in favor of judicial self-restraint in reviewing New Deal legislation in the 1935 *Nebbia* case.

Harlan Fiske Stone, Pillar of the Law, by Alpheus Thomas Mason (Viking Press; $8.75).

He also was the first to recognize that such passivism could hamstring the Court when state or federal restrictions on freedoms of speech and conscience came before it. Stone maintained that these matters held a preferred position in our Constitutional scheme and were entitled to special consideration in the processes of judicial review; furthermore, he was prepared to show exactly what this meant in his monumental and lonely dissent pleading for the invalidation of wartime state compulsory flag-salute statutes, a position which the Court only later accepted as its own. Finally and ironically, after most of the legal fortresses he had laid seige to were captured, Stone was put in command —only to see the Court mutiny in some of the most bitterly personal quarrels in its history.

Why Stone's last four years as Chief should have been plagued by intramural bickering has never been satisfactorily explained. Most post-mortems charge the factionalism of the early forties on the Court to personality troubles. His Democratic associates, it is said, were all too individualistic. Stone himself adopted an attitude of benevolent neutrality.

But this is not enough. All members of the Court, with the exception of Stone himself and Roberts, were Roosevelt men. All presumably were united by some brand of common attitude toward national problems. They were, perhaps, brilliant and erratic, it is true. But brilliance is not the same as irascibility or garrulousness. And none were, like Justice McReynolds for instance, basically cold or difficult people. The Court's factionalism during the forties was more than a personality problem.

Actually it may have been Associate Justice Stone himself, along with the other dissenting liberals of the thirties, who planted the seeds of the difficulty which later plagued Stone as Chief Justice. Until almost the end of the Hughes regime, the Court enjoyed a prestige and symbolism unmatched by any other institution of government. It was the embodiment of the divine ideal of a government of laws and not of men. Roosevelt's political defeat in the court packing plan demonstrates the danger to one who lays rough hands on that sacred ark of the covenant.

Yet Stone, along with Brandeis and Holmes, did just that. The stinging dissents of these three during the twenties and early thirties drummed away at the fact that the rigid constitutionalism of the conservatives on the Court was after all the product of their own personal economic preferences. The triumvirate, in short, challenged the basic motives of the majority. In doing so they came perilously close to charging that judges are human.

This was a calculated risk, of course, and it succeeded in its aim. Out of these dissents, finally accepted by the Court itself in the mid-thirties, was molded a new standard of judicial self-restraint. Although in large part the product of Republican Stone's intellect, it became a tenet of liberal philosophy that the Court's role in the constitutional field was a strictly limited one, and that the essential wisdom of legislation was not a matter for the Court to consider.

With the sole exception of Rutledge, every member of the Stone Court appointed by Roosevelt had been closely tied to the administration—Reed as Solicitor General, Jackson as Attorney General, Douglas as SEC Commissioner, Frankfurter as a Presidential advisor, Murphy as Democratic Mayor of Detroit, Black as Senator. These men were all liberals.

IN such a situation, it is no surprise that deep conflicts and rifts ensued. The justices on the Court in the forties worked under a direct conflict between a firm belief in judicial passivism on the one hand and a loyalty to political activism on the other. It was not always possible to maintain the distinction.

In this context, personal conflict was perhaps inevitable. The struggle of the Court for new moorings during the forties added bite to the inevitable legal differences of Stone's "Wild Horses" during the last years of his life.

Professor Mason's book—which is incidentally the best biography ever written of a Supreme Court Chief Justice, brings Stone out of the shadow and puts his remarkable and fascinating career back into proper perspective.

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A Psychiatrist Comments

From Mescaline to Eternity

IN the last century the wise neurologist Hughlings Jackson offered some advice to psychiatrists. "If you would understand insanity," he said, "you should study dreams." Unfortunately we don't know much about dreams or about sleep in which they occur. And more unfortunately, the dreamer is not around, so to speak, to tell us what he experiences when he dreams. Afterwards he may give a report, but dreams escape through the sieves of memory more readily than any other human experience: what the awakened dreamer tells provides at best a fragmentary and much distorted account of what happened.

Certain drugs remove these limitations by inducing psychological states which closely resemble both dreams and insanity while preserving consciousness in the person affected. He can thus give some account of events as they occur, although as with dreams, words have only a limited power to accompany and to depict experiences which lie far beyond or beneath the psychological level of verbal language. Nevertheless these drugs have recently contributed greatly to our understanding of mental disorders and promise to add further knowledge in the future. Some of them such as *cannabis indica* (hashish) have lengthy histories. Others have only recently become known and used for these scientific purposes. The two best known experimental drugs of this group are mescaline, derived from a cactus which grows in the Southwest and lysergic acid diethylamide, a synthetic member of the ergot group of drugs. A number of other similar compounds exist and attempts have been made to identify a common factor in the structure of these compounds which might account for their extraordinary effect on the human mind. So far these efforts have not brought success, but only its promise.

The structure of mescaline closely resembles that of adrenaline, the substance which squirts into our blood stream when we become frightened or angered. Adrenaline itself in large doses produces distinct psychological disturbances. Two psychiatrists in Canada have suggested that severe stress may release into the blood some toxic substance, perhaps a bastard relative of adrenaline behaving like mescaline. Enough of such a substance might sufficiently interfere with the functioning of the brain to produce a psychosis. It would not take much. Lysergic acid diethylamide acts powerfully in extraordinarily small doses. One can go crazy for eight to ten hours by taking a mere tenth of a milligram.

The use and beauty of this hypothesis is that it may permit a reconciliation between differing viewpoints about schizophrenia. Hitherto we have listened to one-sided arguments which point to the great importance of psychological factors in the origin of schizophrenia and equally one-sided arguments which equally plausibly point to the also established importance of heredity and of physical changes. Each of these emphases may contain part of the truth, but not a monopoly.

Apart from their relevance to schizophrenia we can learn much about the working of the human mind from the use of these drugs. We can, for example, study symbols, dreams, illusions, and hallucinations *in statu nascendi.* One person under the influence of mescaline became cold and simultaneously visualized himself encased in a block of ice. Another wanted to urinate and saw the mental image of a spouting hydrant. We can also learn much about the effects of other people's behavior on the mental state of persons with mental disorders. How quiet friendly conversation may bring the patient out of his reveries which he re-enters when left to himself again. Several antidotes neutralize or modify the effects of these experimental drugs and from their further study may emerge new and better treatments for the psychoses.

The world opened up by mescaline and kindred drugs does not have only the terrors of psychosis within; it also contains transcendental beauty. The perception of colors becomes greatly heightened and the meaning of people and things becomes altered. Thoughts become speeded up and the sense of time changes so that one minute can seem an hour and 60 an eternity. Some of the subjects taking the drug become immersed in the images which well up from within them. They lose their sense of selfness and enter a state indistinguishable from a dream or a psychosis. But others move in the opposite direction. They achieve a heightened sense of their own separateness from the psychic images and a mystical awareness of the Self which ordinarly lies hidden beneath these images.

We do not know whether psychological or biochemical differences account for these variations. Perhaps both influence the results. We have accustomed ourselves to the extraordinary diversity of psychological reactions to similar events. Experiments now teach us that humans also differ greatly in their biochemical responses to the same drugs.

WHAT will eventually come of all this work we cannot predict. Psychiatry may be an old art, but it is a very young science, and the youngest of all important medical specialties. In the early years of its growth few facts were known and theory had correspondingly few restraints. Anyone could appoint himself an expert and erect fabulous theories. His opponents could only arm themselves with counter speculation. The pleasures of debate yielded only slowly to the need for controlled observation, testable hypotheses, and experimental data. But now a new generation asks to see the evidence for assumptions so venerable no one can remember when they were last questioned. Psychiatrists long so busy telling everyone else what to do, have begun to treat their own scientific maladies, and in the experimental psychoses, they have begun in more than one sense to take their own medicines.

IAN STEVENSON, MD

Notes on Contributors

CHRISTOPHER SYKES' most recent book is *Two Studies in Virtue.* ROBERT GRAVES has recently published his collected poems. DAVID RAY is editor of *The Chicago Review.* JAMES T. FARRELL's newest book is *French Girls Are Vicious.* MICHAEL REAGAN is on the Political Science faculty of Williams College. WILLIAM ROGERS is a Washington lawyer. IAN STEVENSON practices psychiatry in Louisiana.

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Correspondence

(*Continued from page 3*)

tional party leadership is also highly perceptive. I wonder, however, whether those Democrats will find any effective spokesman through whom to appeal to the independent and uncommitted voters during the next three years if Adlai Stevenson is allowed to retire completely from the titular leadership. If the party does manage to finance or otherwise obtain radio and television time for an occasional official reply to President Eisenhower, it will probably throw away most of its potential listening audience if it uses any spokesman other than Stevenson.

I was naturally pleased at the references to my own work in the material carried in the box headed "A Two-Party Nation." Perhaps it should be made clear that the first set of figures attributed to me referred only to electoral votes. The second set of figures, moreover, pertained only to the Democratic party in the form in which it was reprinted; the Republican figures were omitted. If any of your readers would like to see the figures for both parties, they can be found in Brookings Institution Reprint No. 15. Single copies are available gratis from the Institution.

PAUL T. DAVID
Director of Government Studies
The Brookings Institution
Washington, D. C.

► *Peace, Virtue and Foreign Policy*

SIRS:

PROFESSOR MORGENTHAU (*NR*, December 10 and December 17) has concentrated his fire on Eisenhower and Dulles, and in terms of their record entirely correctly. However, he might have emphasized more the bipartisan nature of the disastrous policy he attacked. It is not only that President Eisenhower does not believe in the two-party system and regards himself as standing above both parties. And it is not only that the Democratic organization subscribed to this characterization by refraining, for three and a half years of Eisenhower's first administration, from attacking the President himself.

With respect to foreign policy, I believe that the Democrats were reluctant to come to grips simply because they had no fundamental alternative to the Republicans' platitudinous tinsel. When Professor Morgenthau wrote, "The United States has the obligation, owed to itself, to ask which outcome of the venture was more likely to be favorable to American interests and power," he was attempting to teach the Republican leaders the very fundamentals of political economy. But he might have said the same thing to Mr. Stevenson and particularly to Chester Bowles, who presumably would have replaced Dulles in the event of a Democratic victory. If Eisenhower ran for reelection on a platform of Peace and Virtue, Stevenson answered him by calling for the abolition of the draft and the bomb tests—that is, by trying to appear yet more Peaceful and Virtuous. And if Dulles refers all questions to the United Nations as a convenient way to avoid responsibility, Bowles would have done so as a matter of principle.

In short, the inclination to think of foreign policy in moral rather than political terms is not an aberration of the two men now running the nation's affairs. As Professor Morgenthau has pointed out in his several books, this view is endemic in the United States and, since the days of Woodrow Wilson, especially in the Democratic Party. All of the preposterous nonsense we have been hearing these past weeks, from the applause for Nasser's brave struggle against British imperialism to the proclamation of a new era of international morality, fits much better into Democratic than into Republican mouths.

If I were to criticize Professor Morgenthau's very gloomy articles, I would say that they are too optimistic in that they pass over the prevalence of the attitudes he attacks. I do not criticize them, however; I thank you and him for a stimulating experience.

WILLIAM PETERSEN
Boulder, Colorado

► *A Canadian Candide*

SIRS:

I HAVE just read with keen appreciation Mary McCarthy's review of the New York production of "Candide" (*NR*, December 17).

The description "New York production" is not as redundant as it may appear. Concurrently in Toronto, Canada was offered another version of the wholesome French classic, also with music, lyrics, and the occasional flexed instep. Produced at the Avenue Theatre by the New Play Society in a single set with a small cast for a shoe string—well maybe a shoe string and a half with the half well worn—the Toronto show contained much that Miss McCarthy found lacking in New York.

Written, composed, and directed by a very versatile Canadian playwright, Mayor Moore, the show was mordant and funny and neither church nor sex were slighted. More importantly Moore knew what Voltaire was driving at and had no difficulty in restating it in three dimensions.

Something theatre-wise is happening in Canada that should enlist our more studied and respectful attention.

MERRILL DENISON
Toronto, Canada

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As of March 4, 1957, *The New Republic* will be available only to those who subscribe. That issue and all future issues will not be sold on newsstands throughout the nation. This move is dictated by the American News Company, which for many years handled our distribution. Under its new policy, which emphasizes volume sales, American News has informed a number of publications not edited for a mass audience that the Company can no longer afford to place them on the newsstands. From that decision we have no practical appeal—nor do we wish to appeal. The change will have little effect on *NR* circulation. Our subscriptions have increased by 30 percent over the past 12 months—the highest rise in readership in many years. Newsstand sales are less than six percent of total circulation. We naturally hope that this six percent will now buy *The New Republic* by the year, rather than by the week. Former newsstand readers will find that by subscribing, they will receive each issue earlier—and at a greatly reduced cost.

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